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A country choosing to adopt border carbon adjustments based on embodied emissions is mo-
tivated by both environmental and strategic incentives. We argue that the strategic component
is inconsistent with commitments under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
We extend the theory of border adjustments to neutralize the strategic incentive, and consider
the remaining environmental incentive in a simplified structure. The theory supports border
adjustments on carbon content that are below the domestic carbon price, because price signals
sent through border adjustments inadvertently encourage consumption of emissions intensive
goods in unregulated regions. The theoretic intuition is supported in our applied numeric simu-
lations. Countries imposing border adjustments at the domestic carbon price will be extracting
rents from unregulated regions at the expense of efficient environmental policy and consistency
with international trade law.
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1 Introduction
A common suggestion forwarded in the carbon policy debate is that emissions embodied in a
country’s imports should be estimated and taxed just like domestic emissions. These border carbon
adjustments purport to solve a number of problems associated with emissions restrictions that
fail to coordinate at a global level. These problems include the adverse competitive effects for
carbon-intensive sectors in regulated regions and the increase in emissions in unregulated regions
(emissions leakage). In practice, border carbon adjustments face both legal and economic challenges.
These border policies need special consideration under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), as enforced through the World Trade Organization. We argue that a GATT (Article XX)
exception is needed to the extent that the implied tariffs exceed negotiated rates (bindings) and
violate the most-favored-nation principle. Economic theory also fails to provide a clear endorsement
of border adjustments. In fact, a careful look at the 40 plus years of economic theory considering
cross-border externalities rejects the suggestion that emissions embodied in trade should be treated
the same as domestic emissions. Individual countries have both a strategic and environmental
motivation to impose border adjustments and these need to be evaluated in the context of the
GATT.
In this paper we demonstrate that environmentally motivated border carbon adjustments should
be set below the domestic carbon charge. First, we use a transparent two-good two-country theoretic
structure with emissions in only one sector to solidify the intuition behind differential pricing of
domestic emissions and imported embodied emissions. We neutralize the inherent strategic, beggar-
thy-neighbor, component of border carbon adjustments to isolate environmental incentives. In
this context we highlight the fact that border carbon adjustments do discourage carbon-intensive
production in unregulated foreign countries, but they inadvertently encourage carbon-intensive
consumption in foreign countries. Second, we highlight the importance of these theoretic insights
with a set of numeric simulations calibrated to data on global trade, production, and measured
response parameters. The simulations indicate that environmentally motivated embodied-carbon
border adjustments, in practice, should be set well below the domestic carbon price if the goal of
the policy is truly environmental.
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Our reexamination of the theory behind border adjustments and our measurement of optimal
import carbon pricing in a transparent setting is motivated by our observation that suggestions
to base embodied-carbon tariffs on the domestic carbon price have gained significant traction in
the policy debate Mehling et al. (2018). Economists who have proposed equivalent pricing include
Barrett and Stavins (2003), Aldy and Stavins (2008), Cosbey et al. (2012), and Stiglitz (2013).
There is an allure of equivalent Pigouvian pricing of domestic and imported emissions based on
the equimarginal principle, but the equimarginal principle turns out to be misleading in general
equilibrium where trade distortions work through the terms of trade to impact both consuming
and producing foreign agents.
The foundational theoretic work of Markusen (1975) shows that, in addition to a Pigouvian
domestic tax, optimal policy in the presence of a cross-border externality includes environmental
and strategic incentives to distort trade. It might follow then that removing the strategic incentive
indicates an environmental trade distortion that simply taxes embodied emissions at the domestic
Pigouvian rate. This is not the case. Generalized theoretic analysis as offered by Hoel (1996), Jakob
et al. (2013), and in particular Keen and Kotsogiannis (2014) shows that the correct environmental
trade adjustments are complex. An optimal set of environmental tariffs will differ by region and
product in a way that balances the full set of foreign agent production and consumption responses.
In this sense, in the real world, taxing embodied carbon is only narrowly responsive to the carbon
intensity of imports, and this is a strained means of affecting foreign emissions. In fact, we might
bring into question the whole notion of using emissions embodied in trade as the appropriate tax
base, because this construct does not buy us out of the inherent complexity of the problem and
will ultimately lead to a difficult and controversial measurement problem.1
Despite the insights developed by the economists noted above, the inherent suboptimal nature
of Pigouvian based border carbon adjustments seems to be underappreciated in the policy debate.
Our contribution is to build some first-order intuition for why Pigouvian based border adjustments
1Jakob and Marschinski (2012) point out that observing high carbon intensity of a country’s exports relative to
its imports need not even indicate that the country specializes in carbon intensive goods. Following, Leamer (1980),
who considers the classic Leontief Paradox, Jakob and Marschinski (2012) explain that the appropriate indicator of
specialization is the carbon content of exports relative to the country’s average carbon intensity of total production.
This need not map directly into a measure of net trade in embodied emissions, because the productivity of emissions
in different countries is different.
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are suboptimal in the simplest of structures, and even under the constraint that the motivation
is completely environmental. In contrast to the cited theoretic literature that followed Markusen
(1975) we step back to his transparent two-good two-region framework with emissions from only
one good. The theory we present is therefore devoid of the complexities associated with higher-
dimensional trade theory (e.g., Keen and Kotsogiannis (2014)) and embodied emissions in both
imports and exports (e.g., Jakob et al. (2013)). These generalizations are, of course, important,
but our purpose is to demonstrate a more fundamental source of suboptimality that is present
in all of the models. First, we extend the Markusen model to include the constraint suggested
by Böhringer et al. (2014), which effectively neutralizes strategic incentives as a potential source
of deviations between the optimal border charge and the Pigouvian rate. In this clean theoretic
setting we prove that the optimal border adjustment, motivated by purely environmental concerns,
will tax emissions embodied in imports at a rate less than the appropriate Pigouvian domestic tax.
The intuition is clear. While a carbon-based border tariff sends a price signal that discourages
foreign emissions, it also encourages foreign consumption of the more carbon intensive goods.
The simple theory we develop indicates that Pigouvian based border adjustments are likely to
be too high. This is a strong result, but is it valid in a more realistic model with multiple sectors
and regions? More broadly, given that embodied-emissions border adjustments are a popular facet
of real policy proposals, what is the optimal adjustment, conditional on using embodied emissions
as the basis, and how does it relate to the Pigouvian rate? To answer these question we adopt
a calibrated simulation model. We consider Annex-I carbon policy augmented with embodied-
emissions border adjustments. The optimal environmentally motivated embodied-emissions border
adjustment on the carbon content of aluminum and other nonferrous metals is about 40 percent
of the domestic (Pigouvian) carbon price. We perform sensitivity analysis that establishes a link
between our data-driven simulations and the transparent theory. As foreign producing agents
become more responsive to the price signal sent through the border adjustment the higher is the
optimal adjustment. In contrast, the more responsive foreign consuming agents are to the price
signal the lower is the optimal adjustment, because the border adjustment further encourages
foreign consumption of carbon intensive goods.
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It is important to note that we assume that international law is administered under WTO rules
as outlined in the GATT. A country’s membership in the WTO indicates a commitment to a set
of tariff bindings and the most-favored-nations principle as well as a series of exceptions and rules
related to trade disputes and their settlements. We generally adopt the premise that international
law under the WTO is designed to favor a cooperative trade outcome, where countries are punished
if they attempt to use trade restrictions to extract rents from trade partners.2 For the purpose
of this paper we have to make some assumptions about how border carbon adjustments will be
viewed by the WTO because these have not yet been subject to the dispute settlement process. The
optimal tariffs derived in this paper assume that Article XX is used to justify carbon tariffs, and
if Articles II and III were used, the optimal tariff would be different (see Appendix C for further
discussion).
We proceed with the paper as follows: Section 2 provides additional discussion of prior litera-
ture and sets the context for our theoretical and empirical analysis of border adjustments. Section
3 presents the economic theory of optimal border policy, in which we focus on environmental ob-
jectives. Section 4 presents a set of numeric simulations that show the significance of our argument
in the context of a model calibrated to data. Section 5 concludes.
2 Prior Literature
The formal theoretic literature on optimal environmental tariffs begins with Markusen (1975),
establishing the optimal unilateral domestic and trade instruments when facing a cross-border pro-
duction externality. We choose to adopt Markusen’s transparent two-good two-country neoclassical
general equilibrium model as an ideal setting in which to disentangle the strategic and environmen-
tal incentives to distort trade. One useful feature of Markusen’s setting is that it clearly highlights
the role of relative international prices (the terms of trade) as a mechanism to signal foreign agents.
A small country has neither a strategic nor an environmentally motivated incentive to distort trade
because a lack of market power indicates an inability to affect foreign-agent behavior. Focusing
2In addition, it can be argued that the WTO commitments helps a country avoid the temptation to adopt
inefficient, Grossman and Helpman (1994) type, income transfers that benefit specific interest groups at the expense
of aggregate welfare.
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specifically on unilateral carbon policy, theoretical analysis in Hoel (1996) reveals a set of conclu-
sions on the first and second-best policy responses consistent with Markusen (1975) in the more
general context of a model with any number of goods which may, or may not, be tradable. The
central conclusion is that a country’s carbon tax should be uniform across sectors if a set of trade
distortions are available. Hoel’s approach is slightly different than Markusen’s, however, in that
foreign carbon emissions are simply modeled as a function of net imports. We emphasize the full
chain, however, which includes the role of carbon tariffs in sending a price signal to foreign agents,
both consumers and producers.3
Both Hoel (1996) and Markusen (1975) establish an optimal tariff which includes a strategic
term and additive environmental term, but the environmental term is inherently entwined with
terms-of-trade adjustments. Other examples of studies that focus on the general setting of non-
cooperative trade with cross-border externalities include Krutilla (1991), Ludema and Wooton
(1994), Copeland (1996), and Jakob et al. (2013). Ludema and Wooton (1994) do consider the case
of a cooperative trade restriction whereby a domestic environmental tax can be used to manipulate
terms-of-trade in the absence of a tariff instrument. Copeland (1996) also shows that the rent
shifting incentives to distort trade can be strengthened by foreign environmental regulation. We find
that our addition of the Böhringer et al. (2014) constraint is a useful departure from the established
trade and environment literature because it cleanly eliminates strategic incentives allowing us to
focus on unilateral environmental incentives to distort trade. We argue in Appendix C that the
strategic component of the optimal tariff formulas is inconsistent with the GATT exceptions that
provide for environmental protection.4
An alternative approach to eliminating strategic incentives focuses on globally efficient policies.
Keen and Kotsogiannis (2014) offer a critical theoretic contribution by considering a setting of
globally coordinated trade and environmental policy, generalizing the partial-equilibrium analysis of
Gros (2009). While the form of efficient border policy is generally complex, Keen and Kotsogiannis
3Hoel (1996) argues (on page 25) that countries with little market power might still have significant carbon
tariffs. His theory (consistent with Markusen (1975)) shows, however, that the optimal tariff must approach zero as
international market power approaches zero. The distortion cannot be beneficial unless it changes foreign behavior.
4The Chapeau of Article XX of the GATT requires that the excepted border measure not be “a disguised restriction
on international trade.” If the argument for the restriction is environmental (under Article XX), any restriction beyond
what is justified on environmental grounds is a disguised restriction that is not GATT consistent.
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(2014) highlight a special case of conditions and restrictions under which it is optimal to impose
a carbon border adjustment at the difference between the home and foreign carbon tax (their
Proposition 4, p. 124). While these restrictions are likely untenable, the more general theory
presented by Keen and Kotsogiannis (2014) is useful and consistent with our analysis; and the
analysis of other authors who have argued that efficient border carbon pricing depends on the full
general equilibrium responses of foreign producing and consuming agents.
In particular, the line of research exemplified by Jakob and Marschinski (2012), Jakob et al.
(2013), and Jakob et al. (2014) emphasizes that measuring the emissions generated in traded goods
does not indicate the impact of trade on emissions. Rather, we need to know how foreign emissions
change, through shifts in both production and consumption patterns, in response to trade. Again,
as Keen and Kotsogiannis (2014) point out, this indicates that efficient border policy is complex.
In this paper we highlight the general-equilibrium response of foreign consuming agents as one key
source of this complexity. This is not to say that the more general insights offered by Jakob and
Marschinski (2012) and Keen and Kotsogiannis (2014), for example, should be overlooked. In more
sophisticated models (with multiple goods, multiple factors, multiple regions each with different
technologies, and indirect emissions through intermediate inputs) the sources of border adjustment
complexity proliferates.5 In particular, our contribution relative to these prior studies is to reconcile
the constrained Pareto allocation with the real world legal and political situation, and to show that
in this situation equal treatment of domestic emissions and embodied emissions in imports leads
to border adjustments that are too high.
Recommendations to establish a border tariff by applying the domestic carbon price to emissions
embodied in imports, or equivalently requiring forfeiture of an emissions permit upon importing
embodied carbon, are common in the economic and policy literature. Examples of such advice
include Stiglitz (2013), Cosbey et al. (2012), Aldy and Stavins (2008), Barrett and Stavins (2003)
5Our analysis might be cast as a special case of the fully cooperative model considered by Keen and Kotsogiannis
(2014). In particular, we analyze one (relevant) globally efficient allocation where the regulating country is maximizing
welfare subject to holding welfare in the unregulated country fixed. This is a relevant allocation because it is consistent
with the compensatory action that the unregulated country would be entitled to under international trade law.
Gros (2009) also adopts the fully cooperative setting and comes to similar conclusions: the optimal border carbon
adjustment is less than the optimally set domestic carbon price. Thus, we can place our analysis within the literature
that looks at fully cooperative settings in that we generalize the partial equilibrium work of Gros (2009) and we look
at a salient special case of Keen and Kotsogiannis (2014).
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and Mehling et al. (2018). A presumption that border tariffs will tax embodied emissions at the
domestic carbon price is adopted in much of the policy simulation literature.6 A number of these
studies and modeling groups are covered in Böhringer et al. (2012), which summarizes the Energy
Modeling Forum study (number 29) on the role of border carbon adjustments in unilateral climate
policy. Some authors consider border carbon adjustments as sanctions against non-participating
countries [e.g., Böhringer et al. (2013b) and Aldy et al. (2001)]. Fully acknowledging the strategic
value of import restrictions, Böhringer and Rutherford (2017) consider Nash-equilibrium trade
wars based on carbon tariffs and question the credibility of carbon tariffs as an instrument that
would entice the U.S. to return to the Paris agreement. We note for the reader that our analysis
in this paper assumes a one-shot game without strategic retaliation. Our numeric simulations are
informative to the extent that it is politically feasible for countries to impose optimal environmental
border adjustments (below the domestic carbon price) and that there is no retaliation.7
We extend our numeric simulations to consider so-called full border adjustment. Proponents
of full border adjustment advise that, in addition to imposing embodied-carbon tariffs, regulated
countries would impose embodied-carbon subsidies on exports. Elliott et al. (2010) argue that in an
open economy, full border adjustment effectively transforms a domestic production tax on carbon
emissions into a consumption tax on embodied emissions.8 Jakob et al. (2013) use a generalized
version of Markusen’s model (with emissions associated with both the imported and exported
goods) to prove that full border adjustment is not optimal, as optimal trade restrictions should
depend on the carbon-intensity differential between the foreign country’s export and non-export
sectors, and that full border adjustment can actually exacerbate carbon leakage. In our simulations
6One exception is offered by Böhringer et al. (2013a) where a set of scenarios are considered in a Computable
General Equilibrium model that approximate the optimal border adjustments. These are approximations because
they use a set of reference scenarios to establish trade responses and do not explicitly include a valuation for the
environment (which is endogenous to abatement).
7In fact, our argument is that there would be no legal justification for retaliation under the WTO, because the
border adjustments are environmentally motivated. Related to this point is the fact that our theory, and numeric
simulations, rely on a set of transfers from regulated to unregulated countries in order to reveal optimal pricing of
carbon embodied in imports. These income transfers are, to a degree, a convenient construct that allows us to look at
a pure case of cooperative trade. In reality, the compensatory measures offered by the WTO are a set of distortionary
retaliations that erode global efficiency.
8Full border adjustment proposals also have some political advantages as they are favored by domestic producers
of energy intensive goods, and consumption based policies might have broader normative or moral appeal. These are
not, however, arguments that appeal to the efficiency properties.
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we find that, while applying carbon based export subsidies reduces the gap between the domestic
Pigouvian tax and the trade adjustment, it does not eliminate the gap. Consistent with Jakob et
al. (2013), full border adjustment based on the domestic carbon price is not optimal as a unilateral
policy even when countries are constrained to their environmental objectives.9
3 Theory
In this section we present our theoretical analysis. We build on the Markusen (1975) theory
and extend it by introducing a constraint representing the GATT commitment, which effectively
eliminates the non-environmental strategic incentive to distort trade. This framework allows us
to analyze national incentives to distort trade for purely environmental objectives. We derive a
simple closed-form relationship between the optimal environmental tariff and the optimal domestic
(Pigouvian) emissions tax. The key insights provided here include a theoretic foundation for the
optimal environmental tariff under cooperative trade and the divergence between optimal domestic
environmental taxes and the optimal border adjustment. While there are a number of more complex
mechanisms that can yield a divergence between the domestic tax and foreign tariff, our model is
constructed to show that even in a simple setting, there is a first-order, intuitive reason as to why
a Pigouvian tariff is suboptimal.
Consider a two-good two-country (North-South) trade model. Both countries, country N and
country S, produce and trade the goods X and Y , and emissions are a function of the domestic
and foreign production of good X. The emissions level, Z, is represented as follows:
Z = Z(XN , XS). (1)
The efficient transformation function that determines a country’s output of X and Y is given by:
Fr(Xr, Yr) = 0 or Yr = Lr(Xr), r ∈ {N,S}, (2)
9Apart from the discussion in the economic literature, full border adjustment could face international legal prob-
lems. The carbon rebate on exports could be viewed as a per se violation of GATT rules on export subsidies. Cosbey
et al. (2012) argue that export adjustments are not recommended because they clash with trade laws and their
administration is otherwise problematic.
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where Lr(Xr) maps out the efficient frontier (PPF) in terms of Yr as a function of Xr. Letting CiN
represent the consumption of good i in country N , the welfare of the North is
UN = UN (CXN , CY N , Z). (3)
We use Y as a numeraire so that all prices are ratios in terms of Y . Let q, p, and p∗ denote the price
ratio faced by consumers in the North, the price ratio faced by producers in the North, and world
price ratio faced by consumers and producers in the South. The policy instruments considered
are τ , an embodied emissions tariff rate set by the North, and tX , as the emissions tax rate in
the North. While Markusen (1975) considers an ad valorem tax or tariff on production (X), we
consider a specific unit tax or tariff on emissions (Z), which are more aligned with carbon policies
under consideration.10 Assuming no other distortions, the price relationships are
q = p+ tX
∂Z
∂XN




Emissions are not priced in the market equilibrium, but let us denote the marginal rate of sub-
stitution between emissions and good Y as qZ =
∂UN/∂Z
∂UN/∂CY N
, where qZ is negative, reflecting the
negative impact of emissions on welfare.
To consider the optimal environmental policy in a cooperative trade setting, we modify the
Markusen model by adding an endogenous lump-sum transfer that, as demonstrated below, elim-
inates any non-environmental, strategic incentive to distort trade, per Böhringer et al. (2014).11
10Copeland (1996) makes a similar extension to the theory to look at strategic motives to extract international
rents through environmental policy. The pollution-content tariff introduced by Copeland (1996), however, is slightly
different in that it allows for a direct identification of the exporting firm’s emissions on the units exported. The
tariff varies with the amount of pollution during the production of the traded output. This sets up an incentive
for firms to use different processes for domestic versus export markets, and gives Copeland a relatively sharp policy
instrument to target the crossborder externality. In contrast, we assume the tariff is based on the average emissions
rate for the foreign industry as a whole, which is probably more realistic from an administrative perspective. Even
industry-wide measures are ambitious in the context of carbon emissions. With carbon, indirect emissions associated
with intermediate non-fossil inputs—like electricity—are important. See Cosbey et al. (2012) for a discussion of the
practical challenges of setting up embodied carbon tariffs, and Böhringer et al. (2013a) for technical details on how
one might use (imperfect) input-output techniques for calculating the full carbon content by good and country.
11There are alternative ways to represent the constraints imposed by cooperative trade agreements, such as the
potential for retaliatory tariffs. Our formulation of the endogenous lump-sum transfer, however, captures the purest
(transparent) instrument which perfectly neutralizes the strategic trade incentives (what we call cooperative trade).
Distortional retaliation available under WTO rules would have additional general equilibrium effects and therefore
are not considered.
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The transfer payment T is determined such that the South is not made worse off by trade policy
implemented in the North. Let ŪS be the measure of welfare in the South in the absence of tariffs
and let US = US(CXS , CY S) equal the South’s realized welfare.
12 A complementary slack condition
is indicated that ensures GATT consistency of added trade distortions; where US − ŪS ≥ 0 and
T ≥ 0, and T (US − ŪS) = 0. Under a set of border adjustments imposed by the North there is
downward pressure on US and we can be sure that the following holds:
US = ŪS ; T > 0. (5)
Let mi indicate the North’s net imports of good i. The balance-of-payments equation with the
transfer, T , is given by
p∗mX +mY + T = 0, mX = CXN −XN , mY = CY N − YN . (6)
We are primarily interested in the case where the North imports the good generating emissions
(mX > 0) to inform current climate policy debates. The theory, however, generalizes to either
trade pattern.13
We now consider the optimal policy as chosen in the North when environmental policy is
noncooperative, but trade policy is subject to cooperative trade agreements. Given this transfer,
the North sets its embodied emissions tariff τ and emissions tax tX unilaterally, but accounts for
the fact that losses in the South’s welfare require compensation via the endogenous transfer.
Proposition 1. The optimal unilateral emissions embodied tariff and emissions tax in a cooperative







tX = −qZ .
12Note that we only include private consumption in the South’s utility function. This should not be read as an
argument that the South does not value the environment. It is simply an assumption that the WTO-consistent
compensatory action is restricted to lost private consumption.
13In the case that mX < 0, where the North exports the good generating emissions, τ is interpreted as the North’s
export subsidy (or equivalently −τ is the export tax). Thus, the general pricing equation (4) is preserved in any case.
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Proof. See Appendix A
The optimal emissions tax is the Pigouvian rate (−qZ), which is consistent with Markusen (1975).
However, there are two important points of distinction regarding the optimal tariff. First, whereas
Markusen (1975) shows that the optimal tariff includes a strategic component (which is independent
of emissions) in a noncooperative trade setting, we show that the addition of the transfer has
effectively eliminated the strategic component in a cooperative trade setting. Second, although
this isolates the environmental component of the optimal tariff, it is clear that the optimal tariff is
not simply equal to the Pigouvian rate, and the level of the tariff critically depends on the North’s
ability to affect international prices. That is, if dp∗/dmX = 0 the optimal environmental tariff is
zero. A small country cannot send a price signal to foreign agents through a tariff and optimally
chooses free trade.
We next consider how the optimal tariff derived above compares with the emissions tax rate,
which is optimally set at the Pigouvian rate (−qZ).
Proposition 2. In a cooperative trade setting, the optimal embodied emissions tariff is less than
the (Pigouvian) domestic emissions tax rate (τ < tX).
Proof. In order to prove that the optimal tariff is less than the emissions tax rate, we derive
the following equation from the supply and demand relationship (analogous to (6)) for the South




















positive.14 The last term on the right-hand side is equal to unity, and the term dCSXdp∗ must be
negative under (5) as consumers in the South will substitute away from the more expensive good,
noting that under (5) we only have a substitution effect for the South.15 Taken together, the






14An increase in North imports (mX) drives up the international price (p
∗).
15If the South were not compensated the sign of dCSX
dp∗ is ambiguous, given the possibility of being on a backward-
bending portion of the offer curve.
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Thus, τ < tX = −qZ .
The above proof reveals a key intuition behind the sub-optimality of Pigouvian tariffs. Although
the optimal tariff includes the Pigouvian term (−qZ) to reflect the marginal environmental damage
of emissions from the South, it is adjusted by two terms: (1) the ability of the North to influence
prices in the South through changing import volumes ( dp
∗
dmX
), and (2) the impact of that price
change on production in the South (dXSdp∗ ). The tariff decreases the price faced by producers in the
South, and production of X is discouraged in the South. However, the lower price also encourages
consumption of X in the South. Thus, the decrease in environmental damage from decreased
imports is partially offset by the increase in consumption in the South.
Intuitively, τ is an imperfect instrument for influencing production in the South because the price
change is limited by the negative dCSXdp∗ term in equation (8). This is the unintended consumption
effect of the environmental tariff. Consumption of the polluting good is encouraged in the South
making the optimal tariff less than the Pigouvian rate that the North would like to impose on
emissions of production in the South.16 Notice that, in our model, to arrive at the restrictive case
highlighted by Keen and Kotsogiannis (2014), where the optimal environmental tariff has the simple
structure envisaged in the policy debate (τ = −qZ) one would need consuming agents in the South
to be completely unresponsive to price changes (dCSXdp∗ =0). This restriction is not easily defended,
and as such we maintain our assumption of strictly negative substitution effects throughout the
analysis in this paper.
Next, to understand the implications if the North did in fact set a Pigouvian tariff, we consider
the optimal tariff and production tax in a noncooperative trade setting, as in Markusen (1975).
Proposition 3. The optimal unilateral tariff and production tax on embodied emissions in a non-
16In the case of taxes and tariffs on emissions Z, we have shown that the optimal tariff on emissions is strictly less
than the domestic Pigouvian tax on emissions. However, this does not necessarily hold when considering an optimal
tariff/tax on production X as in Markusen (1975) and Jakob et al. (2013). In that setting, it can be shown that the
optimal tariff on X may exceed the domestic production tax on X, see Proposition 2.iii in Balistreri et al. (2015).
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t̃X = −qZ .
Proof. See Appendix B
Consistent with Markusen (1975), the optimal noncooperative import tariff consists of the (non-
environmental) strategic component as the first term and the environmental component as the
second term. Although emissions are not explicitly traded, nonetheless the North’s optimal tariff
contains a strategic component in a noncooperative setting.17 This strategic incentive implies that
the optimal noncooperative tariff will exceed the cooperative tariff.
Thus, a country setting a Pigouvian tariff rate in the cooperative trade setting will functionally
have similar implications as the noncooperative tariff. That is, a Pigouvian tariff set by the North
will exploit leverage over the terms-of-trade to extract rents from the South. This beggar-thy-
neighbor aspect of the Pigouvian tariff comes at the expense of efficient environmental policy and
consistency with the intent of international trade law.
Returning to the cooperative trade setting, equation (7) provides some empirical insight into
determining which commodities potentially have large differences between optimal and Pigouvian
tariff rates. If dp
∗
dmX
is small, the optimal tariff becomes small and the gap with the Pigouvian
rate becomes large. In other words, if changes in imports do not affect world prices significantly
the price signal to foreign agents is weak, and the optimal tariff is close to zero. The amount of
imports relative to world production (import share) can indicate whether dp
∗
dmX
is small or large.
For example, if the imports are a small share of the world market, it is likely that changing the
import amount will not substantially affect world prices.
17Notice that in the absence of the environmental externality (where qz = 0) the standard neo-classical trade result
is obtained, where the domestic emissions tax is zero and the trade distortion is purely a strategic optimal tariff.
Notice also that the form of environmental term in the optimal trade distortion is exactly the same in equations (7)
and (10). This confirms a common assertion made by other authors that the environmental and strategic terms are
independent. While it is obvious that the strategic term is unaltered when we remove the environmental externality
(qz = 0), it is not so obvious (for us anyway) that the environmental term is unaltered under cooperative trade
without adding the endogenous transfer payment (T ) and proving Proposition 1.
13
Also from (7) we see that if dXSdp∗ is small, the optimal tariff becomes small. In this case, if the
world price change does not affect production in non-regulated regions significantly, the optimal
tariff is close to zero. The key responses come from both the consumption and the production
sides of the foreign economy. In the case that consumers in the South are very responsive to price
(high elasticities of substitution) the more negative is dCSXdp∗ , the smaller is the optimal tariff. On
the production side, if production is relatively insensitive to the price changes (low elasticities
of transformation) the smaller is the optimal tariff. Taken together, these indicators of smaller
optimal tariffs imply a larger gap between the optimal domestic carbon price and the optimal trade
adjustments. In the following section we explore the size of this gap, and illustrate its significance
in a model calibrated to data.
4 Embodied-carbon Border Adjustments on Nonferrous Metals
In this section, we use a specific, data driven, illustration of the potential difference between the
optimal domestic carbon price and the embodied-emissions trade adjustment. The context for the
illustration is Annex-I subglobal carbon abatement, where there is an option to impose border ad-
justments on trade in aluminum and other nonferrous metals. Nonferrous metals are a good choice
for the empirical experiment because of their energy and trade intensity.18 These characteristics
make nonferrous metals a likely target of border carbon adjustments. Focusing on nonferrous met-
als also provides a relatively clean experimental setting for our illustration. As a sensitivity case
we include all energy intensive goods (iron, steel, chemicals, rubber, plastic, and other nonmetallic
mineral products) in the coverage of border adjustments. In this case, our conclusion that the
optimal environmental border adjustment is well below the Pigouvian rate is maintained.19
We first describe the model and calibration. Next, we calculate and compare the optimal tariff
18As noted in Cosbey et al. (2012), primary aluminum is identified as an energy-intensive, trade-exposed industry.
A set of full results focused exclusively on aluminum as a subcategory appear in Yonezawa’s thesis [Yonezawa (2012),
Chapter 4].
19We also explored experiments with a broader coverage on non-energy intensive goods. In these cases the optimal
environmental border adjustment was zero for most parameter settings. While in the simple theory presented above
we can be sure that the marginal environmental benefit of a small tariff exceeds the international compensation
costs (at the reference case of a Pigouvian domestic policy), this will not necessarily be the case in the data-driven
simulation model.
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and domestic price in noncooperative and cooperative (GATT consistent) trade settings.20 We
also consider the proposed so-called full border adjustment, where an export rebate is placed on
exported embodied carbon in addition to the import tariff placed on imported embodied carbon.
We conclude with sensitivity analysis that links the simulations back to the basic lessons from the
theory.
4.1 Model and calibration
Our numeric model is a multi-commodity multi-region static general-equilibrium representation of
the global economy with detailed carbon accounting.21 The full algebraic structure of the model
is presented in Appendix D. We follow the model structure employed by Rutherford (2010) in
his examination of carbon tariffs. We also follow Rutherford (2010) and Böhringer et al. (2013a)
in calculating carbon embodied in trade using the multi-region input-output (MRIO) technique.
For every trade flow, a carbon coefficient is calculated that includes the direct and indirect carbon
content, as well as the carbon associated with transport.22
We augment the Rutherford (2010) model to include an explicit representation of environmen-
tal valuation. We include a preference for the environment (disutility from global emissions) in
the Annex-I expenditure system. We use a simple formulation that assumes environmental quality
is separable from consumption with a constant elasticity of substitution between environmental
quality and private consumption of 0.5.23 We calibrate Annex-I environmental preference to be
roughly consistent with contemporary proposals on climate policy. The model is used to compute
20We use the terms “GATT consistent” to indicate a cooperative trade setting. We note for the reader, however,
that an individual country’s GATT commitments do not amount to a commitment to fully cooperative trade. As
mentioned above WTO membership indicates a commitment to a set of tariff bindings and the most-favored-nations
principle, as well as a series of exceptions and rules related to trade disputes and their settlements. The point is that
border carbon adjustments would most likely need to be justified under an Article XX exception, which we argue
precludes new tariffs that extract rents beyond their environmental objective.
21There is an extensive literature utilizing similar numeric simulation models to analyze border carbon adjustments
and climate policy more generally. A recent special issue of Energy Economics was specifically focused on border
carbon adjustments. This issue included 12 papers from different teams studying different aspects of border adjust-
ments. An overview of the special issue and a set of model comparison exercises is provided by Böhringer et al.
(2012).
22When calculating the carbon content of Annex-I exports for the case of full border adjustments below, we do not
include the carbon associated with transport. It is the carbon content at the border that is of interest. Embodied
imported carbon is gross of transport carbon, whereas embodied export carbon is net.
23Non-separabilities could be important in the context of climate change as emphasized by Carbone and Smith
(2013), but this consideration is beyond the theory we illustrate.
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Table 1: Scope of the Empirical Model
Regions: Goods: Factors:
Annex-I Annex I (except Russia) OIL Refined oil products LAB Labor
MIC Middle-High Income, n.e.c. GAS Natural Gas CAP Capital




NFM Other Nonferrous metals
EIT Energy Intensive, n.e.c.
TRN Transportation
AOG All other goods
a carbon cap that yields a carbon price of $35 per ton of CO2 in the Annex-I region (approxi-
mately an 80% cap relative to business as usual). With this reference equilibrium established we
recalibrate the Annex-I expenditure function such that this is the money-metric marginal utility of
(separable) emissions abatement. Therefore, in the calibrated reference case, the Annex-I region is
pursuing optimal unilateral abatement with $35 per ton emissions pricing, conditional on no border
adjustments. With targeted border adjustments, Annex-I can improve its welfare, because, on the
margin, emissions reductions achieved through border adjustments on nonferrous metals are less
costly than domestic abatement.
We also modify the Rutherford (2010) model to include the Böhringer et al. (2014) complemen-
tary slack condition, which under border adjustments is given by equation (5). This eliminates the
strategic incentive for the Annex-I coalition to extract rents from other regions. In this context
carbon-based border adjustments are only used to achieve the environmental objective, per the
preceding theory.
To calibrate the model we use GTAP 7.1 data (Narayanan and Walmsley, 2008), which rep-
resents global production and trade with 113 countries/regions, 57 commodities, and five factors
of production.24 For our purpose, we aggregate the data into three regions, nine commodities
24Updated versions of GTAP (version 9) are now available, but these have not yet been incorporated into this
particular modeling system. The social accounts that we use for this analysis are those developed by Yonezawa
(2012) to include a separate representation of aluminum and a specific environmental externality associated with
carbon emissions. These accounts permit us to consider sensitivity over border adjustments that hit direct and
indirect emissions associated with the narrow commodity aluminum, more broadly on all nonferrous metals, and near
the practical limit of all energy intensive sectors. The model used to illustrate that the optimal environmental border
adjustment is below the domestic carbon price was developed under a donation to the Colorado School of Mines by
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Border Pricing of Embodied Carbon ($/ton CO2)
Welfare
Domestic Carbon Price
at the Optimal ($34.81)
(one of which is nonferrous metals), and three factors of production. To explore targeted border
adjustments on aluminum we split out the primary and secondary aluminum industry from the
nonferrous metals accounts using data from Allen (2010) and the United States Geological Survey
report on aluminum (Bray, 2010).25 Table 1 summarizes the aggregate regions, commodities, and
factors of production represented in the model. Annex-I parties to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) except Russia are aggregated as carbon-regulated re-
gions. The rest of the world is divided into two aggregate regions according to World Bank income
classifications.
4.2 Optimal carbon tariffs
We begin by first considering the optimal border adjustment in a noncooperative trade setting,
which shows that the Annex-I coalition has a relatively large incentive to impose tariffs on alu-
minum and nonferrous metal imports. In this noncooperative setting, Annex-I countries are moti-
vated by both strategic and environmental objectives, and the optimal pricing of embodied carbon
associated with imports is $101 per ton CO2 as illustrated in Figure 1. This is nearly three times
the Alcoa Foundation, and hence aluminum was of interest.
25A full description of the augmentation to the GTAP data to include aluminum (and the computer code used) is
offered in Yonezawa (2012).
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the domestic carbon price. Translating the $101 per ton embodied carbon price into an ad valorem
tariff equivalent results in a 31% tariff on MIC aluminum imports and a 44% tariff on LIC aluminum
imports. The ad valorem rates are lower on other nonferrous metals (23% for MIC imports and 33%
for LIC imports). The differences in these rates across products and trade partners reflect different
carbon intensities.
With the optimal embodied-carbon trade policy established, we now consider a comparison
of embodied-carbon pricing and the domestic carbon price when the border objective is purely
environmental. With the GATT constraint imposed, Figure 2 shows that the optimal trade distor-
tion drops dramatically to $14 per ton. This is less than half of the domestic carbon price at the
optimal. As such, following the prescription of imposing the domestic carbon price on embodied
carbon imports indicates that over half of the trade distortion is a hidden beggar-thy-neighbour
policy. At $14 per ton of CO2, the ad valorem equivalents are modest: 4% on aluminum from MIC,
6% on aluminum from LIC, 3% on other nonferrous metals from MIC, and 5% on other nonferrous
metals from LIC. Thus, in these relatively transparent numeric simulations, we find substantially
lower optimal border adjustments, on the order of 60% lower than the domestic price.
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4.3 Full border adjustment
We now consider the proposal of full border adjustments. In Figure 3 we plot Annex-I welfare
as a function of the carbon price imposed on imports, as well as exports, of aluminum and other
nonferrous metals (full border adjustment). Two results are of note. First, optimal carbon pricing
of trade is much closer to the domestic carbon price. The optimal pricing on embodied carbon in
trade is $28 per ton, which is about 80% of the domestic carbon price. As highlighted by Yonezawa
et al. (2012), a version of Lerner’s symmetry (Lerner, 1936) applies, in that import tariffs are offset
by export subsidies. In this sense, a higher overall pricing of carbon on imports is optimal as long
as there is a counteracting export subsidy. Second, comparing Figure 2 with Figure 3, optimal
welfare in Annex-I is higher under full border adjustments relative to an import-only policy. This
reflects the cost savings due to driving world nonferrous metal consumption toward relatively low
emissions intensive sources.26
The above simulations reinforce the findings of our theoretical analysis that the optimal border
adjustment on carbon is less than the domestic carbon price under a GATT constraint. Further-
more, the simulations show that this difference may be of first-order importance, such that border
26Aluminum and other nonferrous metals produced in Annex-I countries have a relatively lower carbon intensity
(reflected in the embodied carbon coefficients calculated using the MRIO method), and thus Annex-I can improve
welfare through export subsidies which displace high carbon intensive aluminum in other countries.
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Table 2: Optimal Ad Valorem Tariffs and Subsidies on Aluminum and Nonferrous Metals
Trade Import Export Embodied CO2 Domestic CO2 Ratio:
Partner Tariff Subsidy Price (τ) Price (tX) τ/tX
GATT Constrained
ALU: Aluminum
MIC 4.3% $13.98 $34.95 0.40
LIC 6.0% $13.98 $34.95 0.40
NFM: Other Nonferrous Metals
MIC 3.2% $13.98 $34.95 0.40
LIC 4.6% $13.98 $34.95 0.40
Not GATT Constrained
ALU: Aluminum
MIC 31.2% $100.95 $34.81 2.90
LIC 43.5% $100.95 $34.81 2.90
NFM: Other Nonferrous Metals
MIC 23.4% $100.95 $34.81 2.90
LIC 33.4% $100.95 $34.81 2.90
GATT Constrained: Full Border Adjustment
ALU: Aluminum
MIC 8.5% 4.2% $27.57 $34.90 0.79
LIC 11.9% 4.2% $27.57 $34.90 0.79
NFM: Other Nonferrous Metals
MIC 6.4% 3.2% $27.57 $34.90 0.79
LIC 9.2% 3.2% $27.57 $34.90 0.79
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Table 3: Carbon leakage rates (%) decomposed by region
No border Not GATT GATT GATT Constrained:
adjustments Constrained Constrained Full Border Adj.
(τ=0) (τ=$101) (τ=$14) (τ=$28)
Total leakage rate: 18.3 16.0 17.8 17.2
Regional Decomposition:
MIC 14.8 12.8 14.4 13.9
LIC 3.5 3.1 3.4 3.3
adjustments set at the domestic price may be substantially excessive relative to the optimal. Table
2 summarizes the above results for the three scenarios considered. The final column reports the
ratio of the optimal embodied CO2 price relative to the domestic carbon price at the optimal. An
alternative, but equivalent, interpretation of our analysis is that it would be optimal to reduce
the amount of embodied carbon on each trade flow according to the ratio in the final column of
Table 2 if the embodied carbon price were equal to the domestic price. That is, the specific tariff is
simply the product of the applied carbon price and the carbon coefficient so there are any number
of combinations that can result in the optimal. Our point is that the optimal specific tariff is
substantially below an application of the full carbon price on measured embodied carbon.
A central focus of the simulation literature is the leakage rate and the effects of border ad-
justments on the leakage rate. It is well known that in most applied simulation model border
adjustments reduce leakage rates, but have a relatively small impact (Böhringer et al., 2012). We
see a similar pattern in our results. Table 3 reports the leakage rates for our central scenarios.
Leakage is defined as in the literature. It is the ratio of gained emissions in the unregulated regions
to the reduced emissions in the regulated regions. In our central scenario with no border adjust-
ments leakage is 18.3 percent. The lowest leakage rate, 16.0 percent, is attained with the highest
pricing of embodied carbon imports. It is important to consider, however, that rent extraction
accompanies the reduced emissions in unregulated regions. Under the GATT constrained scenar-
ios the marginal value of emissions reductions are balanced with the efficiency cost of the border
distortions, as outlined in the theory.
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Table 4: Sensitivity Analysis on Optimal Border Carbon Pricing Relative to the Optimal Domestic
Carbon Price
Settings Ratio: τ/tX
low central high low central high
Armington Substitution Multiplier 0.5 1.0 2.0 0.55 0.40 0.23
Materials Substitution Elasticity 0.0 0.5 1.0 0.44 0.40 0.36
Energy Substitution Elasticity 0.05 0.5 5.0 0.39 0.40 0.43
Resource Substitution Multiplier 0.5 1.0 2.0 0.37 0.40 0.43
Import Coverage ALU ALU+NFM ALU+NFM+EIT 0.55 0.40 0.59
4.4 Sensitivity analysis
We conclude our numeric simulations with a set of model runs that draw the applied model back to
the theory. We focus on piecemeal parametric changes that impact the important determinants of
the optimal tariff in the formulas derived in Section 3. First, Propositions 1 shows that the optimal
tariff is increasing in market power. We adjust the trade elasticities in the model to illustrate this
effect. Second, the optimal tariff is decreasing in the foreign consumption response. We alter the
elasticity of substitution between the focus goods (aluminum and other nonferrous metals) and
other goods to illustrate this effect. Third, the optimal tariff is increasing in the foreign production
response. We alter the elasticity of substitution between energy and other inputs, and the elasticity
of substitution between sector-specific energy resources and other inputs, to illustrate this effect.
Finally, we change the coverage of the tariffs relative to our central case. We decrease the coverage
to only include aluminum, and increase the coverage to include all energy intensive imports. Table
4 shows the impact on the ratio of the optimal embodied carbon tariff and optimal domestic carbon
pricing across these sensitivity runs.
The trade structure in our model is based on the standard formulation of differentiated regional
goods (the Armington assumption). Under this structure each region’s absorption is in a nested
constant-elasticity-of-substitution composite of imported and domestically produced output. The
trade responses are controlled through the assumed elasticities. In the central cases we use the
elasticities as provided by GTAP, and their weighted averages for aggregates. In the first row of
Table 4 we scale all of these elasticities for the non-regulated regions down by 50% (low) and then
up by 100% (high). As these trade elasticities are scaled down, the Annex-I region gains market
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power, because the other regions are not as easily able to substitute out of Annex-I exports. As
expected, the optimal environmental tariff falls with higher elasticities. When the elasticities are
doubled, the ratio of the optimal embodied-carbon tariff drops to 23% of domestic carbon pricing.
In the second row of Table 4 we change the demand response in the middle income and low
income countries by increasing the elasticity of substitution between intermediate materials. In
the production functions, adopted from Rutherford (2010), the composite of non-energy and non-
value-added inputs substitute at the top level for materials. In our case, materials include aluminum
(ALU), other nonferrous metals (NFM), other energy intensive goods (EIT), and all other goods (AOG).
The central elasticity of substitution between materials and the composite of energy and value-added
inputs is 0.5. To explore the model’s sensitivity to this parameter we scale it down to Leontief (0.0)
and up to Cobb-Douglas (1.0) in the non-regulated regions. As predicted by the theory, the more
responsive is the foreign demand, the lower is the optimal environmental tariff. This is the key
general equilibrium effect that we highlight in this paper. Environmental tariffs, while discouraging
foreign production of the dirty good, inevitably encourage foreign consumption of the dirty good.
In the numeric simulations, agents in the middle and low income countries react to the tariffs by
intensifying their own use of aluminum and other nonferrous metals. As we increase the elasticity of
substitution for materials, this reaction is larger and the resulting optimal Annex-I environmental
tariff is smaller.
In the third and fourth rows of Table 4 we consider the foreign production response. We expect
higher optimal Annex-I tariffs the easier it is for non-regulated regions to substitute out of energy
intensive production. We manipulate two different elasticities to capture this response. First, we
scale the elasticity of substitution between energy and value-added inputs (row 3 of Table 4). We
show that higher elasticities indicate higher Annex-I optimal environmental tariffs, but noticeable
responses require large changes in this elasticity, likely due to the fact that this is an indirect
method of manipulating the production response. In the central case the energy elasticity is 0.5,
and we consider a low value of 0.05 and a high value of 5.0. Even at an elasticity of 5.0 (making
energy a close substitute for value-added in the non-regulated regions) the optimal environmental
tariff only rises to 43% of the domestic tax relative to 40% in the central case. For nonferrous
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metals, changing the energy substitution elasticity often has to work through primary fuels used
in electricity generation and then downstream to electricity used in smelting (the most energy
intensive stage of production). This is on top of the fact that the tariff itself only acts on firms
through an industry-wide price effect. Taken together our simulations reinforces a robust finding in
the literature (see Böhringer et al. (2012)) that carbon tariffs are a blunt instrument for affecting
foreign energy intensity.27
To explore the foreign response of energy-intensive production from a different angle, in row
4 of Table 4, we manipulate the elasticity of substitution between the sector-specific resource in
primary energy (COL, GAS, and CRU) and other inputs. In our model, following Rutherford (2010),
this elasticity of substitution is calibrated to yield specific, local, supply-elasticity targets in the
central case (ηCOL = 1, ηGAS = 0.5 and ηCRU = 0.5, where ηi is the local price elasticity of supply).
We scale the elasticity of substitution down by 50% and up by 100%. This has a direct impact
on quantity responses for fuel production in non-regulated regions. As the theory predicts, greater
response indicates higher optimal environmental tariffs.
In our final set of model runs we consider decreasing the embodied tariff coverage to only
aluminum, and then increasing the coverage to include all energy intensive sectors (ALU, NFM, and
EIT). In the case of just aluminum, the ratio of the optimal carbon tariff to the domestic tax
rises to 55%, and when broadening the coverage to all energy intensive goods the ratio rises even
further to 59%. Given that these sectors have a number of data-driven differences in the simulation
model, it is difficult to obtain a clear prediction from the theory. The Annex-I global share of
consumption is increasing as we increase the coverage, indicating higher optimal environmental
tariffs, but aluminum production and consumption is more concentrated in the LIC region, also
indicating more effective environmental tariffs. Overall, the results are consistent with our central
27A targeted firm-specific tariff as suggested by Copeland (1996) and applied to carbon tariffs by Winchester (2012)
and Böhringer et al. (2017) would have a more direct impact. These authors consider instruments that are based
on the emissions intensity of the firm (or the specific facility within a firm) that exports, rather than applying a
tariff based on industry-average emissions intensity. In this case the unregulated region’s industry would split into
higher-cost abating firms that export, and firms that do not abate but serve only unregulated markets. Targeted
tariffs would more effectively reduce the emissions embodied in trade and reduce leakage while mitigating the problem
highlighted in this paper. Given the opportunity to abate and intensify exports (relative to a tariff based on industry
average emissions) the export segment expands. This acts to increase marginal cost (and price) in the non-export
segment. Relative to a regular border carbon adjustment a targeted firm-specific emissions tariff would mitigate the
price reduction of energy intensive goods and subsequent consumption response.
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argument that the GATT consistent environmental border adjustment is below the domestic carbon
price across a broad range of energy-intensive products.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we argue that proposals to tax the embodied carbon content of trade at the do-
mestic carbon price are inconsistent with established theories of optimal trade adjustments. The
equimarginal principle does not apply for embodied emissions. The case against applying the
equimarginal principle appears in a literature that spans over forty years, from Markusen (1975)
to Jakob et al. (2014), yet this point seems to be overlooked in the policy debate. In our theo-
retic analysis we abstract away from complicating factors: namely beggar-thy-neighbor incentives,
multidimensional issues, and embodied emissions in both imports and exports. We show in this
transparent setting that the optimal environmental border adjustment taxes embodied carbon at
a rate below the domestic carbon charge.
The intuition behind our theoretic analysis is clear. The wedge between the domestic carbon
price and the optimal border adjustment arises in general equilibrium, because border adjustments
inadvertently drive up consumption of emissions-intensive goods in unregulated regions. We feel this
point should be brought into focus for the policy debate. Corollary to our central finding, adopting
embodied carbon charges at the domestic carbon price is (to some degree) de facto a beggar-thy-
neighbor policy. This, in turn, runs contrary to commitments under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) when the policy is justified under an environmental-protection exception.
Our numerical simulations of Annex-I carbon policy illustrate that this is not simply a theoret-
ical concern. We find an optimal import tariff on the carbon content of aluminum and nonferrous
metals that is on the order of 40% of the domestic carbon price. The numeric simulations sup-
port the theoretic findings that optimal environmental tariffs are sensitive to the regulated region’s
international market power and the unregulated region’s consumption and production responses.
We caution that optimal border carbon adjustments are below the domestic carbon price under
cooperative trade. Countries that impose border carbon adjustments at the domestic carbon price
will be extracting rents from unregulated regions at the expense of efficient environmental policy
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and consistency with international law.
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Böhringer, Christoph, Brita Bye, Taran Fæhn, and Knut Einar Rosendahl (2017) ‘Targeted carbon
tariffs: Export response, leakage and welfare.’ Resource and Energy Economics 50, 51 – 73
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Appendix A Proof of Proposition 1
We derive one equation from (6) and two equations from (2), and we substitute those equations into
the welfare change equations in the following pages. First, if a domestic import quantity and the
transfer payment are associated with world price ratio, from the balance-of-payments constraint
(6), we can specify the world price ratio as a function of the import quantity and the transfer as
follows:
p∗ = G(mX , T ), dp
∗ = GmXdmX +GTdT. (11)
Second, as Vandendorpe (1972) derives from (2), the supply relationships are
dXr
dpr






, r ∈ {N,S}. (12)
Third, totally differentiating (2) and dividing by ∂Fr∂Yr yields
∂Fr/∂Xr
∂Fr/∂Yr
dXr + dYr = prdXr + dYr = 0, r ∈ {N,S}, (13)
and at equilibrium, ∂Fr/∂Xr∂Fr/∂Yr equals pr, where pN = p and pS = p
∗. Totally differentiating (3)
and dividing by ∂UN∂CY N yields the change in the North welfare in terms of consumption good Y ,
dUN
∂UN/∂CY N
. Since the welfare in N is maximized when dUN∂UN/∂CY N = 0, we find the conditions to






dCXN + dCY N +
∂UN/∂Z
∂UN/∂CY N
dZ = qdCXN + dCY N + qZdZ, (14)
where, q = ∂UN/∂CXN∂UN/∂CY N is the marginal rate of substitution between goods X and Y , and qZ =
∂UN/∂Z
∂UN/∂CY N
is the marginal rate of substitution between emissions Z and good Y . Again note that
qZ is negative because the emissions level Z has a negative impact on the welfare (∂UN/∂Z is
negative). We make several substitutions to derive the optimal policy conditions. First, using
dCiN = diN + dmi from (6) yields
dUN
∂UN/∂CY N
= dYN + dmY + qdXN + qdmX + qZdZ. (15)
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Second, using dmY = −dT −mXdp∗ − p∗dmX from (6) and dYN = −pdXN from (13) yields
dUN
∂UN/∂CY N
= (q − p)dXN + (q − p∗)dmX −mXdp∗ + qZdZ − dT. (16)
Differentiating (1), and noting that the supply response in S [see (12)] is driven by a change in the










Third, by using q − p∗ = τ ∂Z∂XS and q − p = tX
∂Z
∂XN
from (4) and replacing dZ from (17) and dp∗




































We still need to determine dT , or the change in the transfer required to hold the South’s welfare
constant. Let ES(p
∗, ŪS) indicate the expenditure function of the representative agent in the
South. At the solution, this equals income, which is the value of production at world prices plus
the transfer. Thus we have the following:
ES(p
∗, ŪS) = p
∗XS + YS + T, (19)
and solving for T we have
T = ES(p
∗, ŪS)− p∗XS − YS . (20)








Applying Shephard’s lemma yields
dT = −mXdp∗. (22)
Replacing dp∗ by using (11) gives us
dT = − mXGmX
1 +mXGT
dmX . (23)








































































tX = −qZ .
Appendix B Proof of Proposition 3
The proof is similar to that of Proposition 1, but without the transfer. From equation (18), setting














































t̃X = −qZ .
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Appendix C Legal context
In this appendix we make a specific argument for our interpretation that border adjustments will
need to be justified under the general exceptions offered under Article XX. While there have been
attempts to reconcile carbon based tariffs as a tax adjustment under Articles II and III of the
GATT (and Article XVI for carbon based export rebates), as reviewed below, the general view is
that carbon-based border policies would most easily be legitimized under the General Exceptions
offered under Article XX. In particular, a case can be made that border carbon adjustments are
policy measures covered under either paragraph (b): “necessary to protect human, animal or plant
life or health,” or paragraph (g): “relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources
if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption.” While Article XX offers an opportunity to utilize border carbon adjustments as a
compliment to subglobal action, its preamble clearly sets some limits. The policy measures cannot
be “applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries” and cannot be a “disguised restriction on international trade.” In this context
we argue that carbon adjustments should be limited by their environmental objectives.
There are several good reviews of legal issues related to border carbon adjustments. Tamiotti
(2011), Pauwelyn (2013) and Horn and Mavroidis (2011) cover legal issues for carbon regulation
in the US and/or Europe in general. van Asselt et al. (2009) focuses on the US Climate Security
Act (Lieberman-Warner bill), whereas de Cendra (2006) focuses on the EU ETS. A comprehensive
look at the prospects for border adjustments is offered by Cosbey et al. (2012). In this report
the authors consider a general set of rules for guiding the design of border adjustments. The
literature focuses on some central questions. First, is carbon regulation eligible for border tax
adjustments? Second, are imported products treated less favorably than “like” domestic products?
Third, does discrimination between like imported products from different countries occur because
of the country of origin? Fourth, if border carbon adjustments are not compatible with WTO rules,
can we consider the adjustments an exception?
Border carbon adjustments might be thought of as a type of border tax adjustment, in the same
sense that other indirect taxes are adjusted to account for differences in international treatment.
Under this interpretation, border adjustments may be useful in extending the reach of domestic
policy by filling the gap between domestic taxes and foreign taxes. GATT Article II.2(a) allows
WTO members to impose border tax adjustments as “a charge equivalent to an internal tax ... in
respect of the like domestic product”. GATT Article III.2 also states that foreign products shall
not be subject “to internal taxes or other internal charge of any kind in excess of those applied,
directly or indirectly, to like domestic products.” Border tax adjustments are permitted as long as
they are not in excess of internal domestic taxes. In the simplest example, a sales tax on a foreign
automobile is permitted to the extent that this sales tax does not exceed the sales tax applied
to a “like” domestic automobile. While the sales tax on the foreign automobile is not technically
collected at the border, this is defined as a border tax adjustment under international law, because
it brings the tax treatment of the imported good up to the domestic level under what is termed
the “destination principle” (see GATT (1970)).
Both GATT Article II.2(a) and GATT Article III.2 limit the use of border tax adjustments to
“products.” Taxes on products (indirect taxes) are eligible for tax adjustments, whereas taxes on
factors (direct taxes) are not. The question is whether a carbon tax is an indirect tax or not, and
this interpretation could be contingent on the actual administration of the domestic carbon policy.
For example, a crude oil well-head carbon tax could be viewed differently than a carbon tax on
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gasoline, even if they have (conceptually) the same economic implications.
Another issue related to GATT Article II.2(a) is how to interpret “in respect of an article from
which the imported product has been manufactured or produced in whole or in part.” The question
is whether inputs have to be physically incorporated into the final product. Article II.2(a) may
not permit the application of Article II to energy inputs or fossil fuels used in production. In the
1987 GATT Superfund case, however, the GATT panel found that US taxes on certain imported
chemicals were consistent border tax adjustments, because these chemicals were manufactured using
feedstocks subject to a US environmental tax. This is cited as an opportunity to justify border
carbon adjustments under the same logic.
The legal administration of the carbon policy is also of critical legal importance. Although
economists tend to think that carbon taxes and cap-and-trade schemes are similar (in theory
they can be equivalent), WTO rules are likely to see them differently. Pauwelyn (2013) points
out that a cap-and-trade scheme may not be eligible for border tax adjustment, even if a largely
equivalent carbon tax is eligible. As de Cendra (2006) points out, the permit allocation mechanism
matters. In general, tax adjustments must be an adjustment for a tax, which entails a payment
to the government. Emissions permits that are freely allocated do not directly impact government
revenues, and therefore fall outside the definition of a tax. Auctioned permit schemes do generate
revenues and could more easily fit, legally, under the border tax adjustment provisions.
The key challenge faced by border carbon adjustment as justified under the border tax adjust-
ment provision is that they will be discriminatory. The national treatment principle (GATT Article
III) requires that imported products should not be discriminated against when compared to “like”
domestic products. The most-favoured nation treatment principle (GATT Article I) requires that
“like” imported products from different countries should not be discriminated against because of
the country of origin. But, what are like products? Some products are considered identical as final
products, although the production methods are different. Accordingly, the energy consumption
and embodied carbon can be different for what are traditionally considered “like” products. Given
that carbon (or carbon emissions) is the physical measure of the tax base and embodied carbon
is the basis of border adjustments, it is hard to imagine that the adjustments would meet the
non-discriminatory requirements.
It would seem, therefore, that Article XX would need to be used to legitimize any WTO
compliant border carbon adjustments. Once the border carbon adjustments are adopted under
at least one of the exceptions outlined in Article XX, policy must satisfy the requirements in
the preamble. In other words, the border carbon adjustments must pursue the environmental
objective. In Section 3 we modify the theory on optimal tariffs under cross-border externalities
to isolate the environmental objective. This is done by adopting a constraint that is consistent
with fully cooperative trade, where any unilateral action that extracts rents from trade partners is
directly negated by a compensating transfer back to the harmed trade partner. We thus look at
an ideal world where we have cooperative trade with the exception that unilateral environmental
actions to correct cross-border externalities are allowed. These assumptions are, in spirit, consistent
with the WTO’s overall objective of cooperative trade outcomes with the general exceptions for
environmental protection provided in Article XX.
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Appendix D Simulation Model: Algebraic Formulation
This appendix presents the algebraic formulation of the numeric simulation model and a more
detailed explanation of the specific scenario implementation. The basic structure follows the
GTAPinGAMS multiregion trade model conventions established by Lanz and Rutherford (2016).
The sets include regions indexed by r ∈ R or s ∈ R; goods indexed by i ∈ I or j ∈ I; activities
indexed by g ∈ G = I ∪{c, inv, gov}. Activities include the production of goods and services, i ∈ I,
and the final demand activities: consumption (c), investment (inv), and government purchases
(gov). Included in R is a subset of regions that engage in carbon abatement R̃ ⊂ R. Included
in I is a subset of global transport services Ĩ ⊂ I associated with trade margins. Table 1 sum-
marizes the equilibrium conditions and associated variables. The non-linear system is formulated
in GAMS/MPSGE and solved using the PATH algorithm.28 In addition we have an equivalent
formulation in standard GAMS/MCP format. We proceed with a description and algebraic repre-
sentation of each of the conditions itemized in Table D1.
Table D1: General equilibrium conditions
Equilibrium Condition (Equation) Associated Variable Dimensions
Dual representation of preferences and technologies:
Expenditure function (D.1) ∀r UTLr : Utility index R
Unit-cost function (D.2) ∀r and g /∈ {cru, gas, col} Yrg : Output index G + R
(D.3) ∀r and g ∈ {gas, col}
(D.4) ∀r and g ∈ {cru}
Armington unit-cost (D.5) ∀r and i /∈ {cru} Air : Armington index I + R
(D.6) ∀r and i ∈ {cru}
Unit cost of transport services (D.7) i ∈ Ĩ YTi : Transport Service Ĩ
Unit cost of emissions (D.8) ∀r EMITr : Carbon emissions R
Market clearance conditions:
Market for utility (D.9) ∀r PWr : Unit-expenditure index R
Market for Armington goods (D.12) ∀r and i /∈ {cru} PAir : Goods and Service prices I + R− 1
Market for output (D.10) ∀r and g /∈ {cru} Pgr : Output prices G + R− 1
Market for crude oil (D.11) PCRU : Global price of crude 1
Market for transport services (D.13) i ∈ Ĩ PTi : Price of transport services Ĩ
Market for labor (D.14) ∀r PLr : Price of labor R
Market for capital (D.15) ∀r PKr : Price of capital R
Market for energy resource (D.16) ∀r and i ∈ {cru, gas, col} PRir : Price of resource R + 3
Market for emissions (D.17) ∀r PCARBr : Cost of emissions at production R
Market for coalition permits (D.18) PTCARBE : Cost of a permit 1
Market for abatement benefits (D.19) PENV : Shadow value of abatement 1
Income balance:
Domestic agent income (D.20) ∀r RAr : Income (net of inv + gov + x−m) R
Auxiliary Conditions:
Coalition Emissions Target (D.21) ALLOCATION : Emissions permits 1
Border carbon tax adjustment (D.22) r ∈ R̃ and s /∈ R̃ TAUirs : Border carbon tariff R̃× {R\R̃} × n
Export carbon tax rebate (D.23) r ∈ R̃ SXir : subsidy rate on exports R̃× n
Transfer (D.24) ∀r TRNSFr : Regional transfer R
Appendix D.1 Dual representation of technologies and preferences
Technologies and preferences are represented in the model through value functions that embed
the optimizing behavior of agents. Generally, any linearly-homogeneous transformation of inputs
28See GAMS Development Corporation (2017) and Ferris and Munson (2000).
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into outputs is fully characterized by a unit-cost (or expenditure) function. Setting the output
price equal to optimized unit cost yields the equilibrium condition for the activity level of the
transformation. That is, a competitive constant-returns activity will increase up to the point that
marginal benefit (unit revenue) equals marginal cost.
The first equilibrium condition sets the CES unit expenditure function less the price of utils
greater than or equal to zero:[










− PWr ≥ 0. (D.1)
The arguments in the unit expenditure function are the price index on private consumption (P“c”,r)
and the shadow value representing the marginal benefit of abatement (PENV ). The equilibrium
condition has a complementary slack relationship with its associated variable, which is utility (UTLr)
in each region. At utility levels above zero, which is always the case, the inequality condition above
holds with equality. The elasticity of substitution in this case is 0.5. Notice that we utilize the
calibrated share form of the CES function so the expenditure function is calibrated simply through
reference value shares and reference prices. We do not track the environmental benefits from
abatement as they accrue to non-coalition regions, because we are considering unilateral optimal
policy from the perspective of the coalition regions. Thus θenvr = 0 for non-coalition regions (r /∈ R̃).
The next set of conditions specify the production technologies for each component of G. These
are standard cost functions that indicate production technologies in value-added and intermediate
input components, but included are final-demand activities: private consumption, investment, and
government. For final demand activities the reference value shares for value-added inputs are zero,
which trim off the associated CES nest or branch. With an output tax rate of rtogr we have the




(1−σmgr) + (1− θmgr)(C KLEgr)(1−σ
m
gr)
]1/(1−σmgr) − (1− rtogr)Pgr ≥ 0, (D.2)
which has the unit cost of material inputs (C Mgr) and the unit cost of the capital, labor, and
















































At the lowest nesting level we have the cost of the fuel composite over the subset {cgo} =











where the cost of each fuel will include the associated carbon permit price if applicable:
C FEigr ≡ PAir + φigrPCARBr for i ∈ {col, gas, oil}.
For the sectors that produce fuel resources (coal, gas, crude) we capture resource scarcity in











− (1− rtogr)Pgr ≥ 0. (D.3)











− (1− rtocrugr)PCRU ≥ 0. (D.4)





















and C FEigr is as defined above. That completes the conditions that specify the zero profit condi-
tions associated with the activity level Ygr.
The Armington aggregation of domestic and imported goods is specified in the following equi-










− PAir ≥ 0, (D.5)
where rtdair indicates the benchmark tax on domestic goods and pdrefir is the reference (gross-of-









where the regional component costs include the transport margins




PTj(1 + rtmsisr)(1 + rtiair)
pvtwrisrpmrefir
.
The transport cost is marked up by benchmark import taxes (rtmsisr), input taxes on imports
(rtiair), and scaled by the reference prices. The benchmark and added carbon content tariffs (and
export subsidies) on the actual goods shipment are included in PIMTisr:
PIMTisr ≡
Pis [(1 + rtmsisr)(1− rtxsisr)(1 + rtiair) + ccisrTAUisr − ccisrSXis]
pvxmdisrpmrefir
,
where rtmsisr, rtxsisr, and rtiair reflect the benchmark distortions, and the denominator is the
reference price of bilateral imports. The parameter ccisr is the multi-region-input-output carbon
content coefficient. This becomes relevant when the endogenous instruments (TAUisr and SXis) are
non-zero.
For crude trade we use the index A“cru”,r to track absorption, but there is no Armington
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− PAir ≥ 0; (D.6)
for i = “cru”. All regional taxes on crude oil are included in rtcrur, and pcrurefr is the reference
price.
Transportation services from all regions are combined using a Cobb-Douglas technology. The
zero profit condition is given by ∏
r
Pαirir − PTi ≥ 0 for i ∈ Ĩ . (D.7)
The equilibrium condition associated with regional emissions is critical for controlling the sce-
nario instruments. We generally specify an activity EMITr that tracks total regional emissions.
The activity generates a commodity, with price PCARBr, which is a proportional input to fuel use
(see the definition of C FEigr above). In the case of an unregulated region or in the benchmark
equilibrium this input is free. We still want a representation of emissions, however, so we add a
slight amount of labor inputs to the unit cost of the EMITr activity. In the case of no abatement
policies we have the following dual representation of the activity:
(2× 10−6)PLr − PCARBr ≥ 0 : benchmark ∀r. (D.8a)
The amount of labor used is less than the tolerance for initial data balance, so does not affect the
solution in any significant way. For the coalition countries we solve for an intermediate equilibrium
where an efficient permit system is established with a coalition carbon cap that yields a price of
$35 per ton. In this case the unit cost of emissions reflects the price of permits:
PTCARBE + (2× 10−6)PLr − PCARBr ≥ 0 : emissions cap on r ∈ R̃. (D.8b)
When we endogenize the price of carbon for the coalition PENV is the relevant unit cost (and
θenvr ∀r ∈ R̃ takes on a positive value). This reflects the competition for environmental quality
between its use in production and utility, see equation (D.1). In the reference equilibrium and in
any scenario cases the EMIT activity for the coalition is associated with the following equilibrium
condition:
PENV + (2× 10−6)PLr − PCARBr ≥ 0 : optimal tax in r ∈ R̃. (D.8c)
This condition results in an optimal (Coasian) quantity of abatement in the coalition conditional
on the boarder adjustment policy, if any. Care must be taken in the market clearance conditions,
however, in establishing the appropriate supply of initial environmental quality and demand across
its use in utility and emissions (which includes non-coalition emissions). The structure is checked
at the reference equilibrium ($35 per ton) such that the emissions cap scenario generates the same
optimal coalition abatement (conditional on non-coalition emissions) when environmental valuation
is included. That is, the equilibrium under equation (D.8b) and (D.8c) are the same when we
recalibrate the functions to include a non-zero θenvr and initial endowments of environmental quality,
measured in carbon (with a price of PENV = $35).
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Appendix D.2 Market Clearance Conditions
The first market clearance condition indicates a balance between the nominal value of utility and
household income. The associated price is the true-cost-of-living index (PWr). Market clearance as
a complementary-slack condition (associated with a PWr ≥ 0) requires that the quantity supplied





where φUr is a scale parameter.
Market clearance for output (that is not crude oil) also balances supply and demand, but
demand will be different depending on the sector. In general we have
φYgrYgr −Dgr ≥ 0. (D.10)
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for i /∈ Ĩ ∪ {cru};



















for i ∈ Ĩ .
The aggregate level of investment and government spending is fixed:
D“inv”,r ≡ invr, and
D“gov”,r ≡ govr.
Demand for private consumption is derived from the expenditure function, but for the numeraire










vbs for r = {numeraire region},
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where vbs represents the fixed capital account surplus in numeraire-region consumption units. In the
following definition note that as a matter of notation the restrictions on r apply to the antecedent
term only.
There is a common global market for crude oil. The market clearing condition requires that





φAirAir ≥ 0 for i ∈ {cru}. (D.11)
The Armington composites are demanded at various nodes in the nested preference and tech-




DAigr ≥ 0. (D.12)
DAigr is dependent on the sector it is used in (g) and the placement of i in the CES nesting (as
an energy or material input). If the sector is a non-crude-oil resource sector the input demand is
Leontief everywhere below the resource nest and so only depends on C OTHgr (as defined above):





∀i; g ∈ {col, gas}.
For demand from the crude-oil sector we have the same condition except the price of output is
replaced with the global price of crude oil:





∀i; g ∈ {cru}.
Moving to non-resource sectors the nesting of the technology becomes more complex. Non-energy
goods used in a non-resource sectors enter the materials nest directly:





i /∈ {eng}; g /∈ {col, gas, cru}.
Electricity enters the energy nest











i ∈ {ele}; g /∈ {col, gas, cru}.
Notice that we use the defined unit costs at each node of the nesting to chain out the relative price
impacts with the appropriate elasticity of substitution. Fuels enter the lower-level of the energy
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nest:















i ∈ {col, gas, oil}; g /∈ {col, gas, cru}.






DTSjir ≥ 0; j ∈ Ĩ . (D.13)













For crude oil shipments we have the margin associated with crude oil use in region r:
DTSjir ≡ φtcrujr Air i ∈ cru.





























− (2× 10−6)EMITr ≥ 0. (D.14)
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where the set restrictions on g in equation (D.16) apply for the antecedent term only.






































where the coefficient co2igr reflects benchmark emissions on fuel i in sector g in region r.
The next market clearance conditions depend on the particular scenario. If we run an emissions
cap we have a market clearance condition for endowed emissions permits (which trade at the price





EMITr ≥ 0, (D.18)
where the allocation can be manipulated to hit a target abatement cost. If we are in a central sce-
nario, where the coalition optimally chooses a level of emissions conditional on border adjustments,
we have the market clearance condition for carbon-equivalent environmental quality (trading at a















Appendix D.3 Income Balance
Regional income available for consumption includes the value of factor endowments, less the required
spending on investment and government, plus capital account surpluses. In addition we need to
track all net tax/tariff revenues and rents associated with carbon policy. The logical exceptions
are complex and indicated in the following presentation of the budget constraint. To simplify the
exposition exceptions on sets and scenarios are displayed adjacent to the associated term. That is,
parenthetical restrictions that appear to the right of a term apply for the antecedent term only.
RAr = PLrL̄r + PKrK̄r + PRgrR̄gr
− P“inv”,rinvr − P“gov”,rgovr
+ P“c”,t(vbr) (Note: for t = {numeraire region})









P“c”,t(trnvrs)TRANSFs (t = {numeraire region} and for GATT scenarios)






OTREVgr + TTREVr + CRUTREVr. (D.20)


































































































For non-crude-oil sectors (g /∈ {cru}) output tax revenues are given by
OTREVgr ≡rtogrPgrφYgrYgr g /∈ {cru};
and for the crude-oil sector output tax revenues are
OTREVgr ≡rtogrPCRUφYgrYgr g ∈ {cru}.
We proceed with the tax revenues associated with inputs to the Armington activity. Revenues
are generated from domestic and import input taxes (rtdair and rtiair) as well as tariffs (rtmsisr);
and any export subsidies (rtxsisr) need to be funded. Let us decompose TTREVr into components
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Appendix D.4 Auxiliary Conditions
The auxiliary conditions assist in specifying the endogenous policy instruments. For the carbon
cap scenario the allocation of permits is adjusted to meet a given carbon price relative to the price
of private consumption in the numeraire region:
tgtprc(P“c”,r) = PCARBr for r = {numeraire region}. (D.21)
In the case of border adjustments we are interested in running scenarios with an arbitrary
adjustment price. Let the border carbon price relative to PENV be given by the exogenous scalar
z. Given this information we can calculate the rate at which embodied carbon imports from region




r ∈ R̃ and s /∈ R̃. (D.22)




r ∈ R̃. (D.23)
The final equilibrium condition is the endogenous transfer that compensates non-coalition re-
gions for rent extracting border adjustments. When this condition is activated we have GATT
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consistent border adjustments:
UTLr − Ūr ≥ 0 r /∈ R̃. (D.24)
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